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Meaningful Access: True Equality or 
Frightening Reality? 
Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress, 932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019). 
Mackenzie L. Stout* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “It’s too good to be true” summarizes the decision in Childress v. Fox 
Associates, LLC.  The Childress court admirably aimed to create a more 
accessible society for individuals with disabilities but may have 
unintentionally created the exact opposite.  Courts require public 
accommodations to provide “meaningful access” to individuals with 
disabilities in order to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”).1  However, “meaningful access” is an unclear, evolving standard. 
The Childress decision strayed from precedent by heightening the standard 
for meaningful access to a level equal to identical access.  While this 
heightened standard strives for the goal of true equality, it consequently shifts 
the focus of courts’ decisions to the sufficiency of a claimed affirmative 
defense – that is, the requested accommodation would pose an undue buden.  
Analyzing a case based on the sufficiency of an affirmative defense 
– especially in the context of ADA Accommodations – is detrimental because 
it forces courts to determine whether an accommodation must be provided at 
all, instead of deciding what degree satisfies meaningful access.  The 
 
* B.S.B.A., University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2022; Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022. 
I am grateful to Professor Oliveri for her insight, guidance, and support during the 
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing 
process. 
1. Person-first language is preferred when describing individuals with 
disabilities. Therefore, the description “individuals with disabilities” has been 
incorporated in this Note. See Tara Haelle, Identity-First vs. Person-First Language 
is an Important Distinction, ASSOCIATION OF HEATH CARE JOURNALISTS (July 31, 
2019), https://healthjournalism.org/blog/2019/07/identity-first-vs-person-first-
language-is-an-important-distinction/ [https://perma.cc/8BZS-SZ66]; see, e.g., 
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (providing that “an otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that 
the grantee offers”); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001). 
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framework for analyzing meaningful access set forth by the Childress 
decision may create detrimental impacts long into the future.  
Recognizing the need to create an accessible society for all people, this 
Note highlights the positive strides the Childress Court aimed to establish, but 
it also discusses the dangers this decision creates within litigation as future 
decisions turn on the sufficiency of affirmative defenses.  Part II of this Note 
describes the facts, the lower court’s determination, and the ultimate holding 
in Childress. Part III provides the legal background of the ADA and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s legal precedent for 
“meaningful access” leading up to this decision.  Part IV details the majority’s 
decision to increase the standard for meaningful access for public 
accommodations to comply with ADA requirements and the dissent’s 
criticism of the majority’s deviation from precedent and the future impacts of 
this decision.  Part V comments on the specific ways this decision strays from 
prior decisions within the Eighth Circuit and discusses the future implications 
of this new standard.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Fox Associates, LLC (“Fox Theater”) is a large historic theater in St. 
Louis, Missouri which hosts a variety of live Broadway shows.2  In April 
2016, Childress contacted Fox Theater to request captioning for a 
performance of Rent, a Broadway show scheduled to perform in May 2017.3  
Although Fox Theater provided an American Sign Language (“ASL”) 
interpreter at each production, Childress preferred closed captioning because 
she was able to “experience the writer’s original dialogue and lyrics” 
compared to receiving the lyrics through an interpreter.4  Fox Theater denied 
this request and said it did not offer closed captioning at its shows and did not 
plan to in the future.5  Following that denial, in June 2016, Childress filed suit 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 
Title III of the ADA.6  Plaintiff alleged Fox Theater violated Title III of the 
ADA by failing to provide patrons with hearing impairments with 
 
2. Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress, 932 F.3d 1165, 1168 (8th Cir. 
2019). 
3. Id. 
4. “Open” captioning includes visual captions that are automatically applied for 
all viewers to see. Comparatively, with “closed” captions, viewers can turn these 
captions on or off. John F. Waldo, The ADA and Movie Captioning: A Long and 
Winding Road to an Obvious Destination, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 1033, 1040 (2011) 
(stating that individuals with hearing impairments tend to prefer open captioning); 
Childress,  932 F.3d at 1168. 
5. Id. 
6. See 42 USC § 12182; Childress,  932 F.3d at 1169  
2
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“meaningful access” to the theater’s productions.7  Plaintiff sought injunctive 
relief and wanted Fox Theater to be ordered to “provide open or closed 
captioning at all performances of theatrical productions; publicize the 
availability of captioning and provide means to request captioning; enable 
persons to purchase tickets to captioned performances by non-telephonic 
means, including by electronic mail; and provide hands-free, line-of-sight 
captioning devices.”8 
After the complaint was filed, Fox Theater offered to amend its policies 
to offer a single captioned performance for each Broadway production if the 
patron requested the captioning within two weeks of the show.9  Additionally, 
Fox Theater adjusted its ticket offerings to allow purchases through non-
telephonic means for hearing-impaired patrons.10  Despite making these 
adjustments, Fox Theater stated the captioned showing would only occur 
during the day on a designated Saturday for each tour.11  Childress believed a 
single showtime did not satisfy meaningful access as compared to the 
numerous showtimes non-disabled individuals could attend.12  Due to the 
persistent inequalities and difficulties even after Fox Theater’s adjustments, 
Childress argued its policies still violated the ADA.13  
Both parties filed for summary judgment.  Plaintiff argued the 
opportunities to participate in only one showing for each Broadway 
production is unequal to the multiple showtimes and dates available to non-
disabled patrons.14  Plaintiff claimed this policy violated § 12181(b)(1)(A)(ii) 
and § 12181(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the ADA because the absence of auxiliary aids 
and services caused the unequal treatment of individuals with hearing 
 
7. The term “hearing impairments” and “hearing impaired individuals” is used 
to reflect the language the court used in its opinion in Childress. See e.g., Childress, 
932 F.3d at 1168–70.  
8.  Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2018), aff'd sub nom, Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC Childress, 
932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019). 
9. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169;  Childress, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 
1858157, at *2. 
10. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169  
11. Id. Fox Theater accommodated Childress’s request for a second captioned 
performance of School of Rock, but explicitly stated it would not grant similar requests 
in the future. Id.  
12. Id. The term “non-disabled” is used as recommended by Student 
Accessibility Services as Brown University. See Student Accessibility Services (SAS), 
BROWN UNIVERSITY, https://www.brown.edu/campus-life/support/accessibility-
services/resources-teaching-students-disabilities/appropriate-terminology 
[https://perma.cc/Q9G4-HYS9] (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); see also Equality Training, 
The Art of Respectful Language, 
http://www.equalitytraining.co.uk/images/news/language_of_respect.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BGF-VWRH].  
13. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170. 
14. Id. at 1169; Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 
1858157, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2018). 
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impairments.15  Further, Plaintiff believed Fox Theater was required to 
provide closed captioning for each request in order to provide “equal 
opportunity to the same benefit,” subject only to ADA’s “undue burden” 
affirmative defense.16   
Fox Theater argued its prior modifications to the existing policies were 
reasonable and therefore complied with the “meaningful access” 
requirement.17  First, Fox Theater argued it provided meaningful access to its 
shows by captioning one performance of each production.18  Fox Theater 
contended that one captioned production was reasonable because of the 
expense of a live, in-person reporter to transcribe the words, lyrics, and other 
sounds which was required for captioning.19  In essence, Fox Theater was 
nominally invoking the ADA’s undue burden affirmative defense, which 
holds that a defendant need not provide requested accommodations when 
doing so would cause it financial hardship.20  However, Fox apparently 
waived the right to formally assert this defense because it refused to turn over 
financial information in discovery, which would have been necessary for a 
determination of hardship.21  Although Fox Theater attempted to argue the 
affirmative defense of undue burden on appeal, at the district level, the defense 
had not been officially raised below and was therefore waived.22  Second, Fox 
Theater claimed that requiring captioning for each request is not a reasonable 
modification to its policies, practices, and procedures.23 
The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 
denied Defendant’s motion.24  The court clarified that the provision of the 
ADA applicable to the present lawsuit was 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 
which governs the failure to provide auxiliary aids to individuals with 
disabilities.25  Then, the court stated that to prevail on a Title III ADA 
Discrimination claim the plaintiff must prove: (1) discrimination on the basis 
 
15. Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *3–4.. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at *4; see also Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170. 
18. Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *5. 
19. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169. 
20. 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also Childress, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 
2018 WL 1858157, at *3. 
21. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169–70, 1172.  
22. Id. at 1172. “Fox presents no argument or evidence that “undue burden” or 
“fundamental alteration” excuses its failure.”    Childress, 2018 WL 1858157, at *4. 
23. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (describing discrimination as “a failure 
to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is 
excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other 
individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can 
demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, 
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result 
in an undue burden”). 
4
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of a disability (2) in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Fox Theater (3) by Fox 
Theater’s owner, lessor, or operator.26 
Analyzing arguments presented by both parties, the district court 
determined Fox Theater did not provide “meaningful access” by captioning 
only one showing per tour because that did not provide hearing impaired 
individuals with equal opportunity to the same benefit – show offerings – as 
non-disabled individuals as required under § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).27  The court 
reasoned “a non-disabled, hearing person has the benefit of an expansive 
selection of performances to attend at the Fox Theater and is not limited to 
only one performance on a date preselected by the venue.”28   
Following its declaration that Fox Theater was in violation of the ADA, 
the district court granted injunctive relief.29  The court ordered Fox Theater 
to:  
provide open or closed captioning at all performances of theatrical 
productions where captioning is requested at least two weeks in 
advance; publicize the availability of captioning and provide a means 
to request the accommodation; enable persons to purchase tickets to 
captioned performance by non-telephonic means (including electronic 
mail); and provide hands-free, line-of-sight captioning devices in areas 
designated as accessible seating, and handheld captioning devices in 
all other seating.30  
Lastly, the court concluded by noting Fox Theater failed to assert an 
affirmative defense of undue burden or fundamental alteration.31  
Fox Theater appealed the grant of Plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment.32  On appeal, Fox Theater argued the district court erred in granting 
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying its motion because 
hearing-impaired individuals received meaningful access to Fox Theater’s 
productions.33  In response, Plaintiff argued Fox Theater did not provide 
“meaningful access” to its productions by only captioning one show per tour 
as compared to the numerous showtimes available to non-disabled 
individuals.34 
 
26. Fox does not dispute it is a place of public accommodation and is subject to 
ADA requirements. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170 n. 5.  
27. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1169. 
28. Childress, LLC, No. 4:16 CV 931 CDP, 2018 WL 1858157, at *4. 
29. Id. at *5–6. 
30. Id. at *6. 
31. Id. at *4. 
32. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1170. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1171. 
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff.35  The court concluded Fox Theater’s policy of 
offering a single closed-captioned performance denied individuals with 
hearing impairments an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit as persons 
without hearing impairments.36  Therefore, the policy did not provide 
individuals with hearing impairments with equal opportunity or “meaningful 
access” to the benefits of the Fox Theater.37  The court noted that even though 
Fox Theater failed to provide meaningful access, it could have prevailed by 
raising an affirmative defense at the district level and proving that captioning 
each requested performance would cause an undue financial burden.38  
However, because Fox Theater failed to assert such defense at the district 
level, the court refrained from further analysis on the matter.39  The court 
concluded by providing a caveat to its decision stating “nothing precludes Fox 
Associates from bringing its own lawsuit and seeking to modify the district 
court’s order in this case” if the requested captioning reached the level of an 
undue burden in the future. 40 
The Childress Court concluded that absent an affirmative defense, when 
an individual with a disability is faced with limited availability of public 
offerings because of a lack of auxiliary aids, the individual does not receive 
equal opportunity to the benefit and, therefore, the public accommodation has 
failed to provide “meaningful access” as required by the ADA.41 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses the legal framework of the ADA and courts’ 
interpretation of this statute.  Subpart A discusses the enactment of the ADA 
and focuses on Title III which governs places of public accommodations.  
Subpart B describes the “meaningful access” standard which courts use to 
determine whether public accommodation’s provided aids and 
accommodations comply with the ADA.  Subpart C discusses two common 
affirmative defenses against ADA claims – the undue burden and fundamental 
alteration defenses.  Finally, Subpart D illustrates the evolution of the Eighth 





35. Id. at 1173. 
36. Id. at 1172. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1171. 
39. Id. at 1171–72. 
40. Id. at 1172. 
41. Id. 
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A.  Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA was enacted on January 26, 1990.42  The enactment was 
sparked by Congress’s realization that a “compelling need” existed for an 
official mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities and integrate them “into the economic and social mainstream of 
American life.”43 
The ADA is an expansive statute which forbids discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities in major areas of public life including 
employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and public accommodations 
(Title III).44  Although these categories are inherently broad, specific places 
like theaters and concert halls are well-recognized “public 
accommodations.”45  Section 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iii) – the provision of the ADA 
relevant in this case – prohibits public accommodations from denying 
disabled individuals “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, advantages, or accommodations.”46  A public accommodation 
violates the ADA by failing to take measures to ensure individuals with 
disabilities are not denied “services, segregated, or otherwise treated 
differently . . . because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.”47   
Nevertheless, a public accommodation’s failure to make necessary 
adjustments to ensure complete accessibility does not violate the ADA if 
taking such measures would cause an undue burden or fundamentally alter the 
nature of the good or service.48  
A public accommodation must determine what auxiliary aid or service 
needs to be provided to ensure “effective communication” for an individual 
with a disability.49  Effective auxiliary aids must be accessible, provided in a 
timely manner, and maintain the privacy and independence of the disabled 
individual.50 
 
42. Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(5); S. REP. NO. 101–16 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101–
485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990). 
44. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (1990). 
46. 42 USC § 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(iii) (1990). 
47. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1990). 
48. Id. 
49. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c).  
50. § 4:97. Effective communication must be ensured, 1 Americans with Disab.: 
Pract. & Compliance Manual § 4:97; see also Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 
701 F.3d 334, 343 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “proper inquiry” regarding 
“necessary” auxiliary aids and services is whether the aid provides equal opportunity 
to same benefit). 
7
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B.  The “Meaningful Access” Standard 
Under Title III of the ADA, a public accommodation must provide 
auxiliary aids and services for individuals with disabilities if such aids or 
services are necessary to enjoy “meaningful access” to the accommodation.51  
Courts conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine whether an individual with 
a disability has received “meaningful access.”52  A public accommodation’s 
refusal to provide auxiliary aids and services does not automatically create a 
violation of the ADA.53  Such refusal only violates the ADA if the aid is 
necessary for a disabled individual to receive “meaningful access.”54  
Therefore, if a court determines an aid is required for an individual to receive 
meaningful access, the public accommodation must provide the requested aid 
unless doing so would be an undue burden or fundamentally alter the nature 
of the provided benefit.55 
C.  Affirmative Defenses to ADA Claims 
There are two common affirmative defenses raised by public 
accomodations: (1)  undue burden, or (2) fundamental alteration of its goods 
or  services.56  The burden to prove an affirmative defense is on the place of 
public accommodation,57 and if a defendant fails to raise an affirmative 
defense at the district court level, this constitutes a waiver of such defense on 
appeal.58 
The “undue burden” defense raised by the public accommodation is 
analyzed using a fact-based inquiry which determines whether providing the 
requested aids and accommodations would cause significant difficulty or 
expense.59  To make this determination, courts identify the nature and cost of 
the proposed accommodation along with the financial resources of the place 
of public accommodation.60  This identification requires courts to additionally 
consider the number of persons employed by the public accommodation and 
the effect the request may have on the site’s workplace and operation safety.61 
 
51. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013). 
52. Id. 
53. Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018). 
54. Id. 
55. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001). 
56. See Roberts ex rel. Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 
847 (8th Cir. 1996);  McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 230–31 (3d Cir. 
2017).  
57. McGann, 873 F.3d at 231. 
58. Warner Bros. Ent., Inc. v. X One X Prods., 840 F.3d 971, 980 (8th Cir. 2016). 
59. McGann, 873 F.3d at 231 (remanding case to district court to conduct fact 
intensive inquiry of undue burden).  
60. Id. 
61. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 86 F.3d at 846. 
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An example of the Eighth Circuit finding that a requested 
accommodation would cause an  undue burden can be seen in Roberts ex rel. 
v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc. 62   In Roberts ex rel., the court 
determined that requiring a one-on-one assistant for a child with a disability 
at KinderCare’s child care center amounted to an undue burden.63  The court 
determined it was an undue burden because KinderCare would have to hire 
another employee to assist with this task, and it would cost $205 per week to 
pay the employee while the child was only paying $105 in tuition.64  
Additionally, evidence of KinderCare’s hardship was proven through 
previous closures of other locations due to financial difficulties.65  Lastly, 
KinderCare provided proof of their limited budget, solidifying its defense that 
the requested accommodation would cause an undue burden.66 
Alternatively, if a defendant raises the affirmative defense of 
fundamental alternation, it must prove the accommodation would 
“fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, 
advantage, or accommodation being offered.”67  The Eighth Circuit requires 
a high standard to satisfy the fundamental alteration defense.68  In PGA Tour, 
Inc. v. Martin, Martin, a golfer, suffered from a circulatory disease which 
made it difficult for him to walk.69  Although the PGA Tour typically required 
golfers to walk the golf course, Martin requested an accommodation to drive 
the golf-cart from hole to hole due to his illness.70  PGA Tour refused Martin’s 
accommodation by arguing this adjustment would be a fundamental alteration 
of the nature of the competition.71  The United States Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of Martin and rejected the fundamental alteration defense because it 
noted that the golf cart provided Martin the ability to compete in a competition 
he would otherwise not be able to because of his disability, and did not 
fundamentally alter the competition itself.72  
 
62. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 86 F.3d at 847. 
63. Id. at 846. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 845. 
66. Id. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).  
68. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 (2001); see also McGann v. 
Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2017) (rejecting argument that 
providing an interpreter at movie theater would be a fundamental alternation of 
theater’s services because the theater did not previously provide such accommodation 
in its normal course of business. The court noted that an interpreter did not cause 
significant changes to the video, audio, or physical environment). 
69. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 668. 
70. Id. at 669. 
71. Id. at 670. 
72. Id. at 690. 
9
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D.  The Historically Low Bar to Satisfy Meaningful Access 
Over the years, many cases handed down by the Eighth Circuit indicated 
that public accomodations do not have to meet a high threshold to prove that 
the plaintiff received meaningful access.73  In 2009, the Eighth Circuit 
analyzed “meaningful access” in Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, 
Inc.74  In Mason, a prisoner with visual impairments alleged the jail failed to 
provide him with meaningful access to the prison benefits because of the lack 
of auxiliary aids and services.75  The jail provided Mason with an assistant to 
help him read in the library and use the recreation center, but Mason alleged 
this was not meaningful access because the library did not have braille 
material, and the assistant was not always available when he wanted to use 
the prison’s resources.76  Although Mason was limited with his access to the 
library and recreation center, the court determined Mason was still provided 
with meaningful access and the did not need to provide braille or other 
computer software system.77 
Two years later, the court analyzed meaningful access in Loye v. County 
of Dakota.78  In Loye, the County had to notify its residents after a local 
mercury contamination.79  The plaintiffs, local hearing-impaired residents, 
sued the County and alleged it failed to provide meaningful access to the 
communication relaying the news of the contamination because an interpreter 
was not available for each message.80  The County moved for summary 
judgment and the district court granted its motion, determining that 
meaningful access was satisfied because the plaintiffs received effective 
communication during “relevant periods.”81  On appeal, the judgment was 
affirmed, and the court concluded meaningful access was achieved even 
though the availability of the interpreter was limited.82  
 
73. Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 887 (8th Cir. 2009). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 883. 
76. Id. at 887. 
77. Id. 
78. Loye v. Cty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 2010) (analyzing 
meaningful access until Title II which covers governmental entities. This case is used 
as a support because Title II and III require a similar “meaningful access” standard).  
79. Id. at 495. 
80. Id. at 496. 
81. The court determined the Plaintiffs received effective communication 
without an interpreter during the decontamination process through lip reading and 
gesturing because the County was acting in response to an emergency. Id. at 496–99. 
During the large group meetings, the County provided an interpreter which satisfied 
effective communication. Id. at 498. Lastly, during the family meetings, an interpreter 
was provided at two of the three meetings which was deemed as effective 
communication. Id. at 499–501. 
82. Id. at 501. 
10
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The Eighth Circuit furthered its precedent that “meaningful access” may 
be satisfied with minimal or sporadic accommodations in Argenyi v. 
Creighton University.83  In Argenyi, the district court granted Creighton’s 
motion for summary judgment and determined the plaintiff, a hearing-
impaired medical student, received meaningful access when he was provided 
with one of the three requested hearing accommodations under Title III of the 
ADA.84  The student requested a Communication Access Real-Time machine 
to transcribe spoken words on a computer screen; a translator for his labs; and 
an FM system which would transmit sound into his ears from a selected group 
of students.85  Despite this request, Creighton only provided the FM system.86  
The plaintiff alleged this single accommodation did not “provide for 
meaningful participation or independence as a student” and the single 
accommodation put him at a disadvantage academically.87  On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit described a seemingly low standard for meaningful access by 
stating that aids and services provided to individuals with disabilities were not 
required to produce an “identical result or level of achievement for 
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons.”88  The court further explained 
such accommodations only had to afford individuals with disabilities  “equal 
opportunity to the same benefit.”89  After providing this description, the court 
ultimately reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and 
remanded the case finding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the plaintiff was denied an equal opportunity to benefit from the 
medical school.90  
The Eighth Circuit maintained a seemingly low standard for meaningful 
access in Durland v. Fairview Health Services when it determined that a 
public accommodation satisfied meaningful access even when the provided 
accommodations could recognizably be improved.91  In Durland, the 
plaintiffs, a mother and father, both suffered from hearing impairments.92  The 
plaintiffs sued the hospital for failing to provide meaningful access to the 
 
83. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2013). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 444. FM Systems (“Radio Aids”) assist individuals with hearing 
impairments by picking up sound close to its source and transmitting the noise to the 
individual in an improved, clearer manner by reducing background noise.  FM 
Systems, HEARING LINK, (last visited Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://www.hearinglink.org/living/loops-equipment/fm-systems/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YLP-G6AM]. 
86. Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 444. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 449 (quoting Loye v Cnty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 
2010)). 
89. Id. (quoting Loye v Cnty. of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
90. Id. at 448.  
91. Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 2018). 
92. Id. at 839. 
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hospital’s communication when their son was a patient.93  To communicate 
with plaintiffs, the hospital provided an interpreter and offered a TTY 
machine,94 but the plaintiffs declined use of the TTY machine.95  The court 
explicitly acknowledged the hospital’s accommodations could have been 
improved, but the paintiffs still received the communication, therefore, they 
received meaningful access to the hospital’s services.96  
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
This Part details the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Childress.  Subpart A 
discusses the majority’s decision to affirm the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.  Subpart B explains the dissent’s strong 
criticism of the majority’s decision and its caution about the future impacts 
that may result.  
A.  Majority 
The majority defined “meaningful access” as the equal opportunity for 
an individual with a disability to gain the same benefit as an individual without 
a disability.97  Additionally, the majority stated if an individual requires an 
auxiliary aid or service to receive that same benefit, then the public 
accommodation must provide an aid, but it can decide which form of aid it 
supplies.98  Following this rule, the court noted the large exception that a 
public accommodation does not have to provide the auxiliary aid or service if 
doing so would cause an undue burden or fundamental alteration the nature of 
the provided benefit.99 
The majority’s decision to affirm the district court resulted from Fox 
Theater’s failure to offer additional captioned showtimes for each Broadway 
tour.100  The court determined this single offering “excludes individuals with 
hearing impairments from ‘the economic and social mainstream of American 
 
93. Id.  
94. A TTY machine is a special device for hearing-impaired individuals where 
messages can be typed back and forth to communicate. What is a TTY?, 
ABOUTTTY.COM, http://www.abouttty.com [https://perma.cc/39NR-GV82] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2020). 
95. Durand, 902 F.3d at 840. 
96. Id. at 842. 
97. Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165, 1171 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Argenyi v. Creighton, 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
98. Id. 
99. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).  
100. The second showing for School of Rock was provided with a disclosure by 
Fox Theater that this was an exception to its policy and it would not grant similar 
requests in the future. Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171. 
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life[,]’” which furthers the discrimination that the ADA sought to abolish.101  
Therefore, the court determined Fox Theater did not provide meaningful 
access for individuals with disabilities compared to non-disabled patrons who 
can choose from a variety of showtimes.102  The court acknowledged the 
plaintiffs assertion that Fox Theater’s existing ASL interpreter at each show 
did not satisfy meaningful access for hearing impaired individuals because the 
third party prevented them from experiencing the author’s dialogue 
personally.103  Although the court concluded Fox Theater violated the ADA 
and failed to provide meaningful access, it noted Fox Theater could have 
prevailed by raising the affirmative defense of undue burden and proving the 
expense of captioning, but it refused to explicitly raise that defense.104  
Although the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, it provided a caveat to its 
decision by stating Fox Theater could bring its own lawsuit in the future to 
modify the district court’s orders if the requests for captioning reached the 
level of an undue burden.105 
B.  Dissent 
The dissent expressed its concern for the majority’s decision by opening 
with a strong declaration: “[A] litigation strategy can result in bad law leading 
to unforeseen consequences.”106  The dissent claimed the majority’s 
expansion of the meaningful access standard strayed from precedent and 
“undercut” the standard set before by the Eighth Circuit.107  Moreover, the 
dissent argued the conclusion reached in Childress was a result of Fox 
Theater’s purposeful failure to raise the affirmative defense of undue burden 
in its motion for summary judgment, even though it clearly recognized the 
substantial cost of a live captioning.108  The dissent would have upheld the 
Eighth Circuit’s precedent of a lower standard for meaningful access, which 
only required a public accommodation to provide “necessary aids,” not every 
aid requested.109  
 
101. Id. at 1172 (quoting McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218, 230 
(8th Cir. 2017)). 
102. Id. at 1171. 
103. Id. at 1168. 
104. Fox Theater explicitly stated that it was “not asserting the affirmative 
defense [ ] of ‘undue burden’ ....” Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, No. 
4:16 CV 931 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2018); Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171–72.  The court 
pointed out Fox Theater expressly stated that adding the additional captioned shows 
was not a fundamental alteration, so this defense was also waived. Childress, 932 F.3d 
at 1172 n.7. 
105. Id. at 1172. 
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Along with the criticism of the majority’s decision to deviate from 
precedent, the dissent feared the implications that may result from the 
majority’s decision.110  The dissent believed the law governing ADA 
compliance requires courts to decide the extent of necessary aids that must be 
provided to achieve meaningful access without considering possible 
affirmative defenses.111  The dissent opposed the majority’s heightened 
standard for meaningful access and argued that by requiring Fox Theater to 
accommodate each request for captioning, “meaningful access” became a 
requirement of identical access.112  Further, by increasing this standard to such 
a high degree, the dissent warned that cases would be forced to turn on the 
validity of affirmative defenses, and therefore, decisions could result in the 
absence of an accommodation altogether.113 
The dissent argued that Fox Theater did provide meaningful access 
through its ASL interpreter and other accommodations and it did not violate 
the ADA because the standard is meaningful, not identical, access.114  
Therefore, with this lower standard, the dissent claimed meaningful access 
was satisfied because individuals with hearing impairments could attend a 
specified showing for each Broadway show.115  
V.  COMMENT 
The decision in Childress diverges from precedent in the Eighth Circuit 
by increasing the standard for meaningful access.116  Previously, under 
Argenyi, defendants could satisfy meaningful access without providing each 
requested accommodation.117  Additionally, as Argenyi indicated, an 
accommodation could arguably provide meaningful access regardless of how 
beneficial the aid was for the individual.118  Moreover, under Mason, the 
Eighth Circuit determined meaningful access was satisfied even when the 
accommodations were provided in a limited capacity and on sporadic 
occasions.119  The court reiterated the notion that if there was some way to 
access the accommodation, regardless of its frequency or beneficial results, 







115. Id. at 1175.  
116. Id.  
117. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013). 
118. Id.  
119. Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 887–88 (8th Cir. 2009).  
120. See, e.g., id. at 888 (meaningful access satisfied even when the hearing-
impaired prisoner’s assistant was not always available); Loye v. Cty. of Dakota, 625 
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focus on the ultimate benefit received from an accommodation compared to 
the manner in which the benefit was obtained.121   
Moving away from a previously low requirement for “meaningful 
access,” the Childress Court heightened the standard to require not only 
meaningful, but apparently identical, access for individuals with disabilities, 
absent proof of an affirmative defense.122  Unlike the single accommodation 
which initially sufficed in Argenyi, or the clear recognition that provided aids 
could be improved in Durland, the Childress Court required Fox Theater to 
provide more than one accommodation because the additional aids provided 
an increased benefit.123  The Childress decision sought to ensure that 
individuals with disabilities can obtain the same benefit in the best manner 
possible, which often requires multiple aids and accommodations.124 
After Childress, a public accommodation cannot simply provide an 
adequate accommodation to satisfy meaningful access, it must provide 
numerous accommodations of the highest quality.  This shift in requirement 
is evidenced by the court’s refusal to settle on the ASL interpreter Fox Theater 
previously provided.125  The court increased the meaningful access standard 
to an apparently “identical access” standard by requiring Fox Theater to 
provide captioning at each requested performance, thereby giving patrons 
with hearing impairments the same freedom to choose from a variety of 
showtimes.126  The Childress Court focused on the ultimate benefit 
individuals with disabilities received while also ensuring equality in the 
manner that the benefit was obtained using proper aids and 
accommodations.127  
While the decision in Childress provides hope for a future where 
“meaningful access” amounts to truly equal access for individuals with 
disabilities utilizing the best aids and accommodations, this heightened 
standard may lead to undesirable consequences in litigation.  The Childress 
decision requires public accommodations to provide equal, seemingly 
identical, access for individuals with disabilities.128  The majority reached this 
conclusion without regard to the potential cost of compliance for the 
defendant because the Fox Theater refused to assert the undue burden 
defense.129 This refusal is perplexing, and is likely explained by the fact that 
 
F.3d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 2010) (meaningful access was satisfied when the interpreter 
was not provided at each meeting for hearing-disabled residents). 
121. Mason, 559 F.3d at 888.  
122. See Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165, 1174 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(Grasz, J., dissenting). 
123. Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013); Durand v. 
Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018). 
124. See Childress, 932 F.3d at 1171. 
125. Id.  
126. Id. at 1174–75 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 1171 (majority opinion). 
128. See id. at 1174 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 1171–72 (majority opinion). 
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Fox Theater did not want to produce financial records during discovery.130  
Despite recognizing this importance for true equality, the court protected itself 
with a safeguard by stating Fox Theater can bring its own claim in the future 
to adjust the district court’s ruling if the captioning requests resulted in an 
undue burden.131   
This caveat could lead to endless litigation as Fox Theater or similarly 
situated defendants seek to modify current accommodations any time 
financial difficulties arise.  Furthermore, proving these financial difficulties 
upon refiling may be even easier for the public accommodation due to the 
imposition created the heightened “meaningful access” standard.   The public 
accomodation’s seamless path to proving an “undue burden”  could prevail as 
an affirmative defense to an accommodation altogether, or at the very least, 
reduce the accomodations currently provided.  The court’s safeguard instills 
constant fear that current aids and accommodations could be stripped away at 
any moment based on these future claims.   
At first blush, the overall decision in Childress seems generally positive 
for the disability rights community.  However, as the dissent rightfully 
indicated, the impacts this decision may have in litigation could directly 
contradict the goal of creating a more accessible society.132  A heightened 
standard for meaningful access provides a gold standard where all individuals, 
regardless of a disability, are afforded identical access and equal opportunity 
to the benefit of a public accommodation.  However, this increased standard 
simply forces the weight of the argument to the affirmative defense of undue 
burden.  The higher the standard for meaningful access, the more likely the 
accommodation is to create an undue burden.  While Fox Theater refused to 
assert this defense, it is likely – indeed almost certain – that most future ADA 
defendants will.  
As this new standard plays out in litigation, cases may turn on the 
sufficiency of affirmative defenses which would be frightening as the success 
of these claims could result in a complete lack of accommodation or aid 
provided.  For example, with this heightened standard, plaintiffs are likely to 
prevail in proving that a public accommodation has not satisfied this high 
standard for meaningful access, but the danger lies from this point forward.133  
Once a plaintiff prevails, this leaves the case to turn on the sufficiency of a 
defendant proving an affirmative defense, which will only be easier given the 
heightened (and presumably more expensive) compliance requirements.  
Thus, Childress may have set ADA plaintiffs up to win the battle but lose the 
war. 
Prior to the Childress decision, meaningful access was determined by 
what degree of an accommodation needed to be provided – at what point 
 
130. Id. at 1172 n.7. 
131. Id. at 1172. 
132. Id. at 1174 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 1174–75. 
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meaningful access was obtained.134  Could the public accommodation achieve 
meaningful access by providing three of four requested accommodations?  
The analysis ended before reaching an affirmative defense.  Now, relying 
heavily on the success of an affirmative defense in response to the heightened 
standard, courts may determine defendants do not have to provide any sort of 
aid or accommodation because of the “burden” which may result from 
satisfying such a high standard for meaningful access.  This outcome is scary 
for individuals with disabilities and society overall.  Furthermore, even if the 
affirmative defense fails, the Childress decision leaves the door open for 
defendants to refile in the future if a financial burden develops from 
complying with this new heightened standard.  This caveat could create never 
ending litigation and a constant threat of accommodations disappearing in the 
future.  Therefore, what seems like a positive increase in the requirement for 
meaningful access could create detrimental realizations as this new standard 
unfolds in litigation.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Childress decision increased the standard of meaningful access by 
requiring public accommodations to provide individuals with disabilities an 
equal, seemingly identical, access to achieve the same benefit as non-disabled 
individuals.  This decision strayed from prior determinations in the Eighth 
Circuit and made admirable strides for a future where all individuals, 
regardless of disability, receive identical means of access to achieve the same 
benefit.  Although Childress created an admirable “gold standard” for 
meaningful access, the practicalities of such a high standard may result in 
future litigation turning on the sufficiency of an affirmative defense which 
dangerously creates an all or nothing battle.  
 
 
134. See, e.g., Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Durand v. Fairview Health Servs., 902 F.3d 836, 842 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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